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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN M. GRIMSHAW, Admin-
istratrix of the Estate of Ronald 
Grimshaw, Deceased, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
R & R FL YING SERVICE, INC., 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
No. 
10750 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant in her Amended Complaint sought 
damages for the wrongful death of her husband caused 
by the negligent operation of a commercial, air-carrier 
flight by the defendant in which plaintiff's husband was 
being transported for hire as a passenger. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury and after the appellant 
rested its case, on the third day of the trial, the respon-
dent moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 41 (b) U.R.C.P. 
The trial court granted the motion of respondent and 
dismissed the complaint and thereafter erroneously made 
and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. 
RELIEJ<_, SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
It was error for the trial court to dismiss the plain-
tiff's complaint pursuant to 4l(b) U.R.C.P., and since 
the case was being tried to a jury it was error for the 
trial court to make and enter Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. The Findings and Conclusions 
should be stricken, the Order dismissing the complaint 
should be vacated and reversed and the case remanded 
for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant submits the following Statement of 
Facts in accordance with the well accepted principle 
that when a case is tried to a jury, the trial court must, 
in considering a lVIotion to Dismiss, made pursuant to 
Rule 41 (b) U.R.C.P., consider the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff. 
2 
Prior to and on August 6, 1963, the respondent 
operated a duly licensed, commercial air-carrier service 
for hire. The respondent had a regular place of business 
and held itself out to the public as available for hire. 
It had an arrangement to fly for Utah Power & Light 
Company at the call of the company and to bill the 
company for the flight. ( T-34, 88, 89, 91. Exhs. 3, 4.) 
On August 6, 1963, the respondent was hired by the 
Utah Power & Light Company to fly one of its em-
ployees, (Ronald Grimshaw, the husband of the appel-
lant) on a flight from Richfield, Utah, to Cottonwood 
Canyon southwest of Marysvale, Utah, so that Mr. 
Grimshaw could ascertain the cause of a power failure 
in a power line running southwesterly through the 
canyon from the Marysvale area to Beaver. (T-28, 29, 
33, 34, 42, 44, 87, 97, 98, Exhs. 1, 5, 6, 7.) 
Reed .Madsen, the president of respondent corpora-
tion, first received the flight request at 3 :30 p.m. at his 
residence (T-97). Mr. Grimshaw was to meet the pilot 
at the airport at 4 :00 p.m. ( T-98). The pilot , Ralph 
Ross, was not present at the Madsen residence at 3 :30 
p.m. when the call was received. It was about 15 minutes 
before he returned to the Madsen residence and was 
advised of the call. Thereafter the pilot had to drive to 
the airport ( T-105) . 
'Vhen the pilot (Mr. Ross) arrived at the airport 
~Ir. Grimshaw was not yet present, but another aircraft 
arrived. :Mr. Ross fueled the other aircraft and had a 
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conversation about the weather with the pilot of the 
other aircraft (T-46, 47, 48, 54). It would have 
been at least 4 :00 p.m. before the respondent's aircraft 
with Mr. Grimshaw aboard departed the Richfield 
Airport (T-108). 
The aircraft used on the ill-fated flight was a 
Cessna l 72D ( T-111) . It was being flown by Ralph 
Ross, an officer and an employee of the respondent cor-
poration acting within the scope of his duty and author-
ity ( T-87, 108, Exhs. 5, 6) . Ralph Ross was a commer-
cially licensed and experienced pilot with 2,500 hours 
of commercial flying time (T-92, 93). Mr. Grimshaw 
was also a pilot but relatively inexperienced with only 
277 hours of flying time ( T-246). 
The aircraft was fairly new ( T-119) , had recently · 
had its 100-hour inspection and was in first class condi-
tion (T-120). There was no evidence or claim made 
that there was any indication of any malfunction or fail-
ure of the aircraft, its engine or any of its other com-
ponent parts or any of its instruments prior to impact 
(T-21, 72, 159, R-26). 
On the afternoon of the flight there were cumulus 
clouds (thunderheads) in the area over the mountains 
where the flight would go to make the power line inspec· 
tion. Rain, downdrafts and turbulence could be expecterl 
(T-50, 51, 52, 53). There was a 15-knot wind from the 
southwest (a headwind, considering that the flight was 
from Richfield to .Marysvale) and turbulence in the 
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area (T-167, Ex. 6). There were thunderstorms, rain 
and winds throughout the general area including Mil-
ford, Cedar City, Delta and Bryce Canyon at the time 
of the flight (T-75, 76, 77, 80, Ex. 2). 
\Vinds from the southwest were to be expected with 
resulting downdraft and turbulence on the eastern (lee-
ward) side of the mountains where the crash occurred 
(T-165, 166, 167, 167, 171, 172, 173). Downdrafts and 
turbulence were to be anticipated, expected and guarded 
against where the crash took place on the eastern (lee-
ward) side of the mountains (T-175, 176). Mr. Grim-
shaw relied on the respondent to determine the weather 
conditions and the advisability of flying into the area 
under the existing conditions ( T-170) . 
Because of the effects of altitude and temperature 
on flight characteristics the efficiency of the aircraft at 
the 9,000 foot elevation had been reduced by 77% (T-
lll, 112, 140, Ex. 7). The rate of climb of the aircraft 
had been reduced from 900 feet per minute to 200 feet 
per minute, which is the service ceiling of the aircraft. 
(T-146, 147, 148.) 
Testimony was received that in flying a power line 
inspection in the mountains the safe manner is to first 
top the hill and fly down the line. If there is any weather 
the line is not flown at all. ( T-103, 129). 
It is not safe procedure to fly up the line because 
it does not leave any way out (T-129). By flying down· 
hill you are not faced with a situation where because of 
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the steep rate of climb or the necessity of making a 
sudden sharp bank you are risking a stall (T-131, 223). 
Reed .l\ladsen, the president of the respondent corpora-
tion, and an adverse witness, testified that you never fly 
up a canyon, even in good weather. He characterized 
a flight "up" a canyon as "stupid" (T-131, 132, 133, 
134). 
The crash occurred on the east side of the moun-
tains near the power line which runs generally west and 
then southwest up Cottonwood Canyon from an area 
south of :Marysvale over the mountains and down to 
Beaver on the western side of the mountain ( T-30, 31, 
32, 35, 36, Ex. l). The elevation at Richfield Airport 
is 5,623 feet (Ex. 7). The elevation at the side of the 
crash was 9,000 feet (R-24, T-70, Ex. 6). The moun- 1 
tain rises immediately to the west of the crash site to , 
an elevation of 12,173 feet at the top of Delano Peak 
(Ex. 7, T-152). At the site of the crash Cottonwood 
Canyon runs in a generally east-west-west direction 
( T-37, 61) . The bottom of the canyon floor at the site 
of the crash was only 50 yards wide ( T-66) . The plane 
with its dead occupants was found in the bottom of the 
canyon, twenty-five to thirty yards south of the creek 
and the nose of the plane was headed south into the side , 
of the south canyon wall (T-36, 37, 38, 60, 155, 156, 
158, 162, 229). The canyon wall to the south of the 
crashed aircraft rose steeply above the aircraft ( 1'-39, 
(W, 64). The ridges on the south, west and north sides 
of the canyon rose 1,000 feet above the crash site (T-
6 
lfil) . The plane could not have topped any of the ridges 
from the position it was in (T-161, 162). 
The aircraft departed Richfield Airport at 1600 
( 4 :00 p.m.) (Ex. 6). Flying time from the Richfield 
A.irport direct to the crash site is 25 minutes ( T-103, 
104, 184, 185). A damaged watch found in the wreck 
had stopped at 4 :25 ( T-70, R-25). It would have taken 
IO or 15 minutes more than the actual elapsed time to 
fly to the top of the mountain and then back down the 
line (T-185). 
Reed Madsen, an experienced pilot and the presi-
dent of respondent corporation explained in detail the 
principles of flight. He testified that if an airplane main-
tains speed the airflow over the wings creates sufficient 
lift to cause the plane to fly. If the speed is reduced, 
the lift is reduced and the airplane stalls ( T-121). If 
the airplane stalls control is lost (T-126). If control is 
lost the aircraft has a tendency to wing over ( T-127) . 
The aircraft was in a wing-over position at the time of 
crash ( T-171) . If there is adequate elevation to regain 
flying speed, control is restored and there is no problem 
( T-124) . If you are flying downhill even a downdraft 
will not cause a stall ( T-224). A steep bank increases 
the possibility of a stall ( T-176). On a downhill flight 
steep banks are not required ( T-235). 
Reed Madsen filed a formal report of the accident 
arnl testified concerning the cause of the crash. He said 
that the crash was caused by a stall of the aircraft and 
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the resulting loss of control ( T-179, 180, 200, Ex. 61 
and that the stall was caused by downdraft and existing 
turbulence (Ex. 6) which were to be expected (T-181). 
The pilot didn't leave an adequate margin of safety 
and didn't have sufficient altitude to recover from the 
stall (T-180, 181, 182, 183, 184). He indicated that the 
pilot lost control of the aircraft ( T-228) and that loss 
of control is pilot error ( T-229). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANT-
iNG RESPONDENT'S .MOTION TO DIS-
.MISS AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE AP-
LANT'S CASE BECAUSE THE APPELLANT 
PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE. 
It is a long established and well accepted principle 
of law that the trial court in considering a Motion to 
Dismiss made pursuant to Rule 41 (b) U.R.C.P. must 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
appellant. The appellant is also entitled to have this 
Honorable Court 
"ReYiew all of the evidence, together with 
every logical inference which may fairly be dr~w'.~ 
therefrom in the light most favorable to him. 
(:Martin Y. Steyens, 121 Utah 484, 243 P.2d 
747). 
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The appellant in Count One of her Amended Com-
plaint pleaded the specific negligence of the defendant 
aud in Count Two pleaded a negligence case under the 
theory of res ipsa loquitur to be inferred from the gen-
eral circumstances surrounding the crash. This court 
has previously recognized the right of a party to proceed 
under both specific negligence as well as under the doc-
trine of res ipso loquitur. In the case of Loos v. Moun-
tain F'uel Supply, 99 Utah 496, 108 P.2d 254, under 
headnotes 12 and 13 on page 259 this court said: 
"In some cases where specific acts of negli-
gence are alleged in the complaint the specific 
allegations of violation of duty can be ignored 
and the pleadings still show a cause of action 
based on res ipsa liquitur .... Nevertheless we 
think one who wishes to rely on that doctrine, 
as well as specifically assigned acts of negligence, 
must so plead, either by a separate count or by 
proper allegation to the effect that the negli-
gence to be inferred from the general situation 
caused the injury, thereby notifying the other 
party that he intends to rely on the Doctrine of 
res ipsa liquitur." 
There is substantial and compelling evidence of 
the respondent's negligence in undertaking the flight in 
the existing weather conditions. There is evidence of the 
respondent's negligence in attempting to fly "across" 
or "up" the canyon instead of following safe procedures 
and flying "down" the canyon. There is substantial evi-
dence that the fatal crash would not have occurred in 
the absence of negligence and from those facts an inf er-
9 
ence of negligence could be drawn by the jury under the 1 
theory of res ipsa loquitur. 
It is submitted that this appellant properly plead 
and proceeded to try the case under both the theory 
of specific negligence and res ipsa loquitur. It is also 
submitted that the appellant established a prima facie 
case under both theories and that the evidence viewed ill 
the light most favorable to the appellant entitled her 
to have the case submitted to the jury. 
POINT II 
THE RESPONDENT WAS A "CAR· 
RIER FOR HIRE" AND OWED TO RON-
ALD GRIMSHAW THE DUTY TO EXER-
CISE THE "UTMOST CARE" IN TRANS-
PORTING HIM SAFELY. 
The respondent was licensed as a commercial flight 
operator on January 18, 1963, under License No. 11, 
issued by the Utah State Aeronautics Commission, pur-
suant to 2-1-35 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (1966 
Pocket Part, page 83). 
2-1-1 (31 and 32) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 1 
( 1966 Pocket Part, page 79) defines: 
"Commercial flight operations shall be defin~d 
as the carrying of persons or goods for hire 
" 
The respondent was also licensed as a commercial , 
carrier by the Federal Aviation Agency (T-91). Re- · 
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spondent held itself out to the public at large as being 
a carrier for hire (T-88, 89, Ex. 4), and was regularly 
hired by the Utah Power & Light Company to transport 
its employees (T-34). 
In response to a call from the Utah Power & Light 
Company the respondent undertook, for compensation, 
to transport Ronald Grimshaw, an employee of Utah 
Power & Light Company, on an observation flight 
of a power company line. Under these circumstances, 
the respondent was a "carrier for hire" and as such owed 
Ronald Grimshaw, its passenger, the duty exercise 
lhe utmost care in transporting him safely. 
In Volume 8, Am. Jur. 2d, AVIATION, Sections 
37 through 46, inclusive, Carriers in relation to aviation 
are defined: 
Section 38. "Generally, a 'common carrier' 
may be defined as one who holds himself out to 
the public as engaged in the business of trans-
porting persons or property from place to place, 
for compensation, offering his services to the 
public generally; the distinctive characteristic 
of a common carrier is. that he undertakes to 
carry for all people indifferently, and the domi-
nant and controlling factor in determining the 
status of one as a common carrier in his public 
profession or holding out, by words or by a 
course of conduct, as to the service offered or 
performed. A 'common carrier of passengers' 
has been defined generaly, as one who undertakes 
to carry for hire all persons who may apply for 
passage, provided there is sufficient. space or 
room available and no legal excuse exists for re-
11 
fusing .... Furthermore, scheduled operations 
upon regular routes are not essential to a finding J 
that a carrier of passengers by air is a common 
carrier, and 'air taxi senices' may be held or 
found to be operated as common carriers. Sight. 
seeing flights are also usually deemed to fall 
~it?in .th~ classification where the carrier accepts I 
md1scnmmately all who apply so long as there is 
room and no legal excuse for refusing, and the 
fact that the airplane does not carry passengers 
from one point to another, but regularly returns . 
without landing to the place from which it start· : 
ed, has been held not to prevent the operation 1 
from being that of a common carrier." 
In the case of Arrow Aviation, Inc. v. Moore,: 
C.C.A. 8th Cir., 266 F. 2d 488 ( 1959), the Court said: . 
"'Vheti1er an air carrier is a common carrier 1 
is determined by the same principles as are ap· 1 
plied in the cases of carriers by other means .... 1 
A carrier is a common carrier if it holds itself , 
out to the public as willing to carry all passengers 
for hire indiscriminately. The holding out may 
be either by advertising or by actually engaging 
in the business of carriage for hire." 
In Christensen v. Oregon S.L.R. Co., 35 Utah 137, 
1 
99 P. 676, (19oq) the Court stated: 
"The law imposes the duty upon the carrier 
of exercising the utmost care to protect his pa~· 
sengers against accidents; and, in case an ac~1· 
dent occurs, the inference arises that the carrier! 
has not exercised that high degree of care which 
the law imposes." 
In McMaster v. Salt Lake Transportation Co.,i 
108 Utah 207, 159 P.2d 121 (1945), the court stated:\ 
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"The duty imposed upon the defendant by 
law was to use the utmost care to transport the 
plaintiff safely." 
In the case of Johnson v. Lewis, 121 Utah 218, 
2-i<O P.2d 498 (1952), the court quoted with approval 
language from an opinion by Judge Learned Hand and 
again reaffirmed and restated the duty owed by a carrier 
to its passenger: 
"A carrier of passengers has indeed an impor-
tant public function, and a lawful personal inter-
est in his calling; so far as concerns those whom 
he does not carry, these excuse injuries which 
might be avoided, if he were extravagantly far-
sighted. But his very enterprise is to carry pas-
sengers safely, and he is bound to a much longer 
forecast of the dangers which surround them than 
he is as regards strangers. It is not perhaps im-
portant in just what terms this duty is measured; 
usually they include the 'highest human fore-
sight' possible in the circumstances. (Citing 
cases.) It is, enough that the law exacts from him 
a solicitude which would be unnecessary, and 
indeed undesirable, in most enterprises. We are 
not therefore to measure what the defendant 
should have foreseen by ordinary standards, the 
law imposes on him a meticulous regard for pos-
sibilities which should ordinarily be ignored. " 
POINT III 
THE FACTS VIEWED IN THE LIGHT 
)JOST FAVORABLE TO THE APPELLANT 
F.STARLISH THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE 
HESPONDENT IN THREE PARTICULAR 
AHEAS: 
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(I) IN UNDERTAKING TO TRANSPORT 1 
THE PAS SENGER INTO THE MOUNTAIN. I 
ODS TERRAIN IN THE FACE OF THE 1 
WIND, TURBULENCE AND WEATHER 
FACTORS KNOWN BY THE RESPONDENT 
J 
OR WHICH, IN THE EXERCISE OF THE 
CARE AND DUTY REQUIRED, SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN KNOWN BY IT. 
(2) IN FLYING THE AIRCRAFT ACROSS 
THE CANYON IN VIOLATION OF SAFE . 
FLIGHT PROCEDURES. 
(3) IN FLYING THE AIRCRAFT UP THE 
CANYON IN VIOLATION OF SAFE FLIGHT 
PROCEDURE. 
A disinterested witness, who is also a pilot and : 
therefore interested in weather conditions, testified that · 
she made an observation of the weather conditions from 
the Richfield Airport immediately prior to the origina· 
tion of the ill-fated flight and that she observed cumulus 
clouds (thunderheads) in the immediate area and over 
1 
the mountains where the crash ultimately occurred and 
within one hour thereafter (T-50, 51, 53, 56). Don , 
Elmer, a weather observer for the United States 1 
Weather Bureau, testified and also identified Exhibit 2 I 
which was offered and received in evidence. His testi· : 1 
mony and Exhibit 2 establishes winds, thunderstorms, 
thunderheads and rain in the general area of the state 
where the crash occurred, including Milford, Cedar . t 
I f City, Delta and Bryce Canyon (T-75, 76, 77, 80, 81). ~ 
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The most persuasive testimony concerning wind 
and weather conditions was elicited from Reed Madsen 
' the president of the respondent corporation and an 
adverse witness. Exhibit 6, which is a report prepared 
and filed by Madsen within ten days after the crash, 
indicates a 15-knot wind from the southwest and exist-
ing turbulence (Ex. 6). Mr. Madsen's testimony also 
established that downdrafts and turbulence could be 
expected in the area (T-171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 
178, 220, 221). His testimony further established that 
Ronald Grimshaw relied on the respondent to determine 
the weather conditions and the advisability of flying in 
those conditions ( T-170, 171), and that there was no 
aircraft malfunction and that the crash resulted from 
loss of control by the pilot occasioned by a "stall" caused 
by the pilot's error in flying into a steep, narrow canyon 
and there being confronted with turbulence and down-
draf ts which should have been expected (T-72, 172, 228, 
229, 180, 200). Mr. Madsen also testified that if there 
were adverse weather conditions the flight should not 
have been undertaken (T-103). 
From the foregoing facts the jury could have 
reasonably found that the respondent failed to exercise 
the required care, judgment, prudence and foresight in 
undertaking the flight and that the fatal crash was proxi-
mately caused by that failure. 
Mr. Allen L. Simkins, the Sheriff of Piute County, 
testified that he visited the crash site early the morning 
following the crash and spent all the next day at the 
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site and that he made observations of the terrain. He 
described the terrain as "rugged country, awfully steep 
country." He said the "plane was, oh, I would say 
twenty-five to thirty yards south of the creek, rigl;t 
on the bottom of the canyon, and it was - the nose wa; 
headed towards the south and it was upside down.' 
( T-60, 64). He testified that the bottom of the canyo11 
was only 50 yards wide and that it went up equally steep 
on either side of the canyon ( T-66). The south ca11yun 
wall was characterized as "very steep." ( T-39). ~Ir. 
_Madsen, the adverse witness, testified that it was "prob-
ably one thousand feet from the aircraft up to the top 
of the ridges." (T-161). 
All of the evidence indicated that at the site of the 
crash the canyon runs in a generally east-west direction 
( T-36, 37, 61) and that the aircraft crashed hea<le<l 
south into the side of the south canyon wall ( T-36, 37, 
38, 60, 155, 156, 158, 162, 229). 
The adverse witness, Reed Madsen, testified that 1 
it would require one-half mile to turn the plane aroun<l 
1 
( T-177) and that the plane couldn't have "topped" the 
ridges from its position in the canyon ( T-161, 162). He . 
further testified that the only safe procedure is to fly ! 
down the canyon so that you will ha~e a way out (T-103. I 
129, 131, 132, 133). He characterized any other pro- : 
cedure as stupid (T-134). 
The evidence was conclusive that at the time of 
the crash the aircraft was in a steep banking turn to th' , 
right ( 'l'-71). which would he directing the flight of the 1 
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aircraft from south (across the canyon) to west (up 
the canyon). 
From the foregoing facts a jury could reasonably 
have found that the pilot was directing the aircraft either 
across (south) or up (west) the canyon at the time of 
the crash and that to do so was in violation of the respon-
dent's duty to exercise the required degree of care for 
the safety of Ronald Grimshaw. 
The testimony of Reed Madsen, the adverse wit-
ness, clearly established that the only safe way to make 
the flight under any circumstances is to fly down the 
canyon (T-129, 131, 132, 133, 134, 223). The testimony 
of Mrs. Peterson, when coupled with that of Reed Mad-
sen, establishes that the aircraft could not have departed 
the Richfield Airport prior to 4 :00 p.m. ( 1600) ( T-46, 
47, 48, 54, 97, 98, 105). Furthermore, when Reed Mad-
sen filed his official report within ten days after the 
fatal crash he in di ca ted a 1600 ( 4 :00 p.m. ) departure 
time from the Richfield Airport (Ex. 6) . He further 
testified that flying time direct from the Richfield Air-
port to the crash site is 25 minutes (T-103, 104, 184, 
195). A damaged watch found in the wreck had stopped 
at 4 :25 (T-70, R-25). It was also Mr. Madsen's testi-
many that to first fly to the top of the mountain and 
then fly back down the canyon would require IO or 15 
minutes more (T-185). 
Mr. Madsen also testified concerning the rate of 
climb of the aircraft (T-111, 112, 140, 146, 147, 148, 
Ex. 7). Based on his testimony the amount of time nee-
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essary to leave Richfield and climb to the top of the 
mountain can be mathematically computed to be 32 
minutes: Mt. Delano elevation 12,173 feet minus Rich-
field elevation 5,623 feet equals 6,550 feet divided by 
200 feet per minute (the established rate of climb\ 
equals 32 minutes. If the pilot had first "topped" the 
mountain, it would have required several more minutes 
to fly back down the canyon to the crash site. 
From the foregoing facts a jury could reasonably 
have concluded that the respondent, in violation of safe 
flying procedures, attempted to fly up the canyon since 
there was only sufficient time lapse, between takeoff at 
4 :00 p.m. and crash at 4 :25, to fly direct to the site which 
direct flight would of necessity be up the canyon. There 
was not sufficient time elapse ( 32 minutes plus) to have 
"topped" the mountain and then have flown back down 
to the crash site. If the jury found that the Respondent 
attempted to fly "up" the canyon it would be compelled 1 
to find that the death of Ronald Grimshaw resulted from 
the failure of the respondent to exercise the required 
degree of care for his safety. 
POINT IV 
THE APPELLANT PLEAD RES IPSA 
LOQUITUR IN COUNT TWO OF HER 
AMENDED COMPLAINT, AND IS EN· 
TITLED TO HA VE A JURY CONSIDER I 
THE EVIDENCE UNDER THAT THEORY. ~ 
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In Horsley v. Robinson, 112 Utah 227, 186 P.2d 
592, at page 599, the Utah Supreme Court unequi-
vocally stated and adopted the common law theory of 
res ipsa loquitur when it stated at page 599: 
"It is universally recognized that negligence 
may be inferred from the happening of the acci-
dent and the surrounding facts and circumstances 
where the facts are such as to reasonably justify 
such inference even though there is no direct 
testimony to establish the exact grounds of negli-
gence which caused the accident." 
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has adopted 
the theory that where the duty is that of the utmost care 
owed by a carrier to its passenger that, 
". . . in case an accident occurs, the inference 
arises that the carrier has not exercised that high 
degree of care which the law imposes." See Chris-
tensen v. Oregon S.L.R. Co., 35 Utah 137, 99 
P.676 (1909). 
A general statement of the law of res ipsa loquitur 
as it relates to aviation cases is set forth in 6 A.L.R. 2d 
528 where it is stated as follows on page 529: 
"It may be stated as a very general proposition 
that, to the extent that the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur is recognized and applied in the par-
ticular jurisdiction in negligence actions gener-
ally, it is applicable in actions arising out of avia-
tion accidents where the airplane or other instru-
mentality was under the exclusive control and 
management of the defendant, and the a~cid~nt 
was of a kind of character that does not ordmarily 
happen if due care is used. The doctrine has 
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been applied most frequently in actions for the 
injury or death of passengers for hire. It has 
been stated that it is peculiarly suitable in actions 
against common carriers, due to the higher degree 
of care required. The doctrine has also been 
applied in actions for the injury or death of au 
occupant other than a passenger for hire, and 
for injuries to persons and property on the 
d " groun ... 
In the case of Stoll v. Curtiss Fying Service, an-
notated in 6 A.L.R. 2d 536, the court applies the alter-
native theory of res ipsa loquitur to aviation cases. The 
rule is similar to that suggested in the Utah case of 
Loos v. Mountain Fuel Supply, supra. In Stoll v. Cur-
tiss Flying Service the court instructed the jury as 
follows: 
"You must not invoke that doctrine if you find 
that the accident happened as the plaintiff's wit-
nesses claim it did, and that the claim indicates 
to you negligence on the part of this pilot. The 
presumption can only be invoked if you find that 
the plaintiff did not prove what caused the acci-
dent. If you find that the cause the plaintiff 
adduced or suggested was not the cause, the 
plaintiff is in the position of not knowing the 
cause, and he, therefore, may invoke the doc-
trine." 
It is submitted that the evidence readily supports 
an inference of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur. The jury, from the evidence, could have rea-
sonably found the following facts: 
1. The aircraft was under the exclusive control of 
the respondent. 
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2. That the crash was of such a nature that it would 
not have happened in the ordinary course unless the 
respondent had failed to exercise the duty imposed by 
law - the duty to exercise the utmost degree of care 
in the transportation for hire of its passenger; the duty 
not to fly into the canyon at all in face of the weather 
and the to be expected turbulence and downdraft; nor 
to fly up the canyon or across the canyon under any 
circumstances. 
Ronald Grimshaw was an amateur pilot and since 
the aircraft had dual controls it has been the contention 
of the respondent that the aircraft was under the control 
of Ronald Grimshaw. There is absolutely no evidence 
of control of the aircraft by Ronald Grimshaw. In the 
absence of such evidence the law does not support the 
contention of the respondent but presumes that the 
control was in the respondent. In the case of Lange v. 
Nelson-Ryan Flight Service, Inc., 108 N.W. 428 
(Minn. 1961), a licensed pilot was flying with a flight 
instructor and both were killed in a crash of the air-
plane. The court held that the duty of care owed to the 
plaintiff by the defendant was equivalent to that owed 
by a carrier and that negligence can be inferred where 
evidence tends to exclude all causes for a crash other 
than human fa ult. The court further said that where 
there is no evidence as to who was operating the con-
trols, and the crash results from negligence, the pilot 
in command is responsible and is considered to be negli-
gent regardless of whether or not he is at the controls 
at the time of the calamity. 
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The respondent at the time of the crash was licensed 
by the Federal Agency and the regulation of that 
Agency is published in 14 C.F.R. 91.3 (1965): 
"The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly 
responsible for, and is the final authority as t~, 
the operation of that aircraft." 
The Utah State Aeronautics Commission has by 
reference adopted the Federal Regulations. Subsection 
1. (a) of Section III of the Rules and Regulations 
adopted and promulgated by the Utah State Aero-
nautics Commission provides as follows: 
"Pilots operating aircraft over the lands and 
waters of the State of Utah shall comply with 
all pertinent rules and regulations of the United 
States Government, relating to air traffic, and 
all rules and regulations promulgated by the 
Utah State Aeronautics Commission." 
Under the circumstances of this case where the 
respondent is a carrier for hire and where there is no 
evidence to the contrary, it may be said as a matter of 
law that the aircraft was under the exclusive control of 
the respondent. 
There was no explanation of the crash inconsistent 
with the respondent's negligence and there was no evi-
dence of aircraft malfunction. To the contrary, all of the 
evidence indicated that the aircraft was functioning 
properly at the time of the crash (R-25). The only 
explanation for the crash was the pilot's negligence 
(see Ex. 6). 'Vi th reference to that Exhibit the adverse 
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witness, Reed Madsen, the president of the respondent 
corpora ti on testified ( T-179) : 
Q. Is this the report that you filed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In the report you described the flight to the 
best of your knowledge? 
A. To the best of my knowledge, yes, sir. 
Q. And your description of the flight was: Pilot 
left Richfield at 1600 to check power line 
after trouble reported by Utah Power & 
Light Company. Power Company Bent em-
ployee on flight. 
From experience of pilot reporting it was 
believed Mr. Ross had flown part of line. Due 
to steep terrain he probably pulled off the 
line and into a side canyon to lose altitude to 
come back onto line at lower altitude. The 
canyon has existing turbulence and down-
draft. The plane was probably taken down 
by severe downdraft and pilot made steep 
right bank to avoid crashing side of canyon. 
Aircraft stalled in bank and struck a tree? 
A. This would be one explanation. 
Q. It was your explanation, wasn't it, Mr. Mad-
sen? 
A. I don't think there is any such thing as an 
explanation. It could have happened that 
way. This is one way. Other things could 
have happened, but this is just one of the 
ways. 
Q. This is merely your best opinion as to what 
happened? 
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A. This is correct. 
( T-228) Q. It's nice to ignore all we do know 
inclding your inspection or your investiga'. 
tion and your experience by the facts that you 
know and the opinoin you expressed as to 
what happened, you just indicated and with 
that indication that he lost control of the 
aircraft; is that right? 
A. This is my opinion as stated in that report. 
I testified that I agreed as to this being one 
good plausible explanation. 
Q. And that would indicate the pilot lost control 
of the aircraft? 
A. He could have. 
Q. And that loss of control of the aircraft in your 
opinion would be pilot error, would it not! 
A. It depends upon the circumstances. If there 
was some unforeseen circumstances, no. If it 
was circumstances that he erroneously got 
himself into, yes. 
Q. Directing your attention to your deposition, I 
Mr. Madsen, page 49, the question was asked / 
you on line 3, if an airplane has its power, I 
then went into a stall as a result of pilot error I 
unless it is done intentionally and you an· 
swered: "At a low altitude possibly, yes," I 
and the question, "But certainly to stall it out . 
in that canyon was an error, was it not?" And I 
your answ~r: "I suppose it would have to be. 
They are both dead." Is that correct? I 
A. The answer on line 6 I said, "Possibly, yes.'' / 
I 
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It can no longer be said that flying is inherently 
dangerous. This court in this modern age can take judi-
cial notice of the advertised fact that "it is safer by far 
to travel by air." Principles of flight are known, under-
stood and practiced. Aircraft overcome the forces of 
gravity and fly, and their occasional failure is not due to 
some mysterious force or act of God. Their failure is 
either mechanical or the failure of the pilot to exercise 
that degree of care, judgment, prudence and foresight 
which is consistent with the dangers involved. 
From the occurrence of the crash and in the absence 
of any explanation for the cause of the crash, the in-
ference arises that the respondent carrier for hire failed 
to exercise that high degree of care which the law im-
poses upon a carrier for hire. A jury could have so 
found. 
POINT V 
THE DEFENSES OF ASSUMPTION OF 
RISK AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
HY RONALD GRIMSHAW ARE 'VITHOUT 
MERIT. 
A. Assumption of Risk 
The respondent in its answer to appellant's 
Amended Complaint asserted the theory that Ronald 
Grimshaw assumed the risk. The law is otherwise. In 
the case of Foa; v. Trans World Airlines, 20 F.R.D. 565 
(lTSDC, E.D. Pa. 1957) the court stated: 
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"Finally, in view of the well settled rule that 
a passenger on a common carrier does not assume 
the risk of an injury to himself of his property 
due to the negligence of the carrier, and u;r 
modern view that the rules applicable to common 
carriers of passengers apply with equal force to 
aircraft, it follows that the defense of assumption 
of risk is without merit and is stricken." 
In Urban vs. Frontier Air Lines, 139 F. Supp. 288 
(USDC, 'Vyoming, 1956) the court said: 
" ... it can. no longer be said that a passenger 
entering upon the modern commercial plane 
voluntarily assumes a risk with respect to the 
plane itself or its operation .... 
The rules applicable to common carriers of 
passengers apply with equal force to aircraft .... 
It follows that the defense of assumption of risk )/ 
is without merit." 
In Montellier v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 38~ / 
(USDC, E.D. New York, 1962) the court said: 1 
I 
"It is now well settled that merely by boarding 
the plane commercial airline passengers no longer / 
assent to encountering a known danger either I 
with respect to the plane itself or its operation." 
! 
B. Contributory Negligence 
The respondent also raises the defense of contrib· I 
utory negligence. It is difficult to see how a passenger I 
being transported by a carrier for hire can contribute to I 
the negligence of those charged with the duty to trans· I 
port him safely. 
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In the absence of any proof of the negligence ~f 
tlie passenger the law would be as stated in Culver v. 
Sckulich, 80 Wyo. 437, 344 P.2d 146 (1959), wherein 
the court stated: 
"\Ve agree with the defendant that there was 
no proof of the passenger being careful, but 
neither was there any proof of his being negligent, 
and under such circumstances the legal presump-
tion is that he was alert to the preservation of 
his own life and well being." 
This court has adopted a principle of law estab-
lishing a presumption of due care in cases of retrograde 
amnesia. In the case of Ewan v. Butters, 16 Utah 2d 
1 272, 399 P.2d 210 (Utah 1965) the court stated: 
"'Vhere the loss of memory rendering the sur-
vivor of an accident incapable of testifying as 
to the accident is shown to be attributable to such 
accident, it will be presumed, in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, that he exercised due 
care." 
It is submitted that the same principle should apply 
where the party is not merely suffering from retrograde 
amnesia, but is dead. If that principle is applied the 
presumption is that in the absence of evidence to th~ 
contrary, the deceased passenger, Ronald Grimshaw, 
was exercising due care for his own safety. 
It is of no avail to the respondent to suggest that 
the flight was inherently hazardous - for the duty of 
the carrier for hire is commensurate with the risk. If the 
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Hight was hazardous, then the respondent was under u 
duty imposed by law to apprehend the risks and dangn, 
involved and to consequently exercise a greater degree 
of human foresight, caution and prudence. 
Subsection 4. (a) of Section III of the Rules and 
Regulations of the Utah State Aeronautics Commis-
sion adopted and promulgated pursuant to 2-1-12 Utali 
Code Annotated, 1953, provides as follows: 
"No person shall operate an aircraft within 
the State of Utah in a reckless or careless man-
ner or in such a way as to endanger the lives or 
property of persons on the ground or in the air." 
If it is the contention of the respondent that the 
Hight was inherently dangerous, then it is an admission 
that the flight was being operated in violation of the 
foregoing regulation - which would in and of itself 
be negligence. 
CONCLUSION I 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO UN· , 
DERSTAND THE FACTS AND CONSIDER I 
THEl\1 IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN i 
FACTS OF AVIATION AND THE PRE-
V AILING LAW. 
The trial court demonstrated its lack of under· 
standing of the facts when it stated in the presence of I 
the jury (T-226): 
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"I don't think there is a man living who knows, 
of course, save and except the two occupants of 
that plane .... If we knew what that flying was, 
then I think you would have a right to ask 
whether or not that would be safe flying." 
and on page T-227: 
"May I say that my point is that no one knows 
the circumst:,inces." 
and on page T-228: 
"I repeat again, if he knew what the pilot was 
doing at that particular time, what prompted 
him to go where he went, then I think you would 
have a right to say to him as an expert now, would 
flying under these conditions be the prudent 
thing to do or would it not be, but this jury must 
conclude this and it is their province to determine 
whether or not there was negligence in this par-
ticular instance, based upon the facts and cir-
cumstances. I C¥1't believe that we've got enough 
factual matters here, because no one knows, no 
one knows, consequently I am going to deny or 
sustain the objection." 
There has been transmitted to this court as part 
of the record on appeal an affidavit of the Court Re-
porter who reported the trial proceedings. It is to be 
noted from the affidavit that the reporter lost his notes 
of the arguments of counsel and the remarks of the court 
made during the argument. We assume that other 
counsel will remember the remark of the trial judge and 
will not object to our recital of the same even though 
it is not in the record. At the conclusion of the arguments 
nn the defendant's motion to dismiss and as a prelude 
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or an explanation - an apology, even for his decision 
' 
the trial court stated: 
"I have never been in an airplane and I am 
never going to." 
The trial court apparently overlooked all of the 
facts and adopted the "old-fashioned" attitude that fly-
ing is inherently dangerous and there is and can be no 
explanation for the crash of an aircraft - except that 
it is a mysterious happening - an Act of God. 
It is submitted that in the early days of flight -
prior to \Vorld 'Var II - the courts of this land would 
have agreed with the trial court. But, it is also submitted 
that in this modern, technical age it is known that air· 
craft fail because of understood mechanical failures or 
because of the pilot's error in operating the aircraft 
in certain unacceptable manners or in weather and 
terrain known or reasonably expected to be hazardous 
to the operation of an aircraft. 
\Vhile the law may not keep constant pace with 
the progress of technology, it is suggested that the 
modern cases dealing with aviation problems have rec· 
ognized that there is nothing mysterious about flight 
and that when the facts are known the reason for a flight 
failure is readily understood. 
It is submitted that in this case sufficient facts arc 
known to explain and permit an understanding of tht 
failure. That knowledge and that understanding permit 
and demand the application of long standing and 'rell 
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accepted legal principles to the end that the appel-
lant in this action may have her full day in court includ-
ing the right to have a jury consider the known facts 
under modern and appropriate instructions as to the law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN T. VERNIEU and 
JAMES P. COWLEY 
of Pugsley, Hayes, Rampton & Watkiss 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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